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HENRY V. BALLARD & CORDELL, CORP.:
LOUISIANA CHOOSES A POINT IN TIME IN THE MARKET
VALUE GAS ROYALTY CONTROVERSY
Defendant, an oil and gas drilling company, executed mineral leases
with four different parties between 1953 and 1961. Two of the leases
based gas royalties on the "market value" of the gas at the well when
the gas was "sold or used off the premises" and on the "amount
realized" from the sale of the gas when the gas was "sold at the well."
The other leases simply based gas royalties on the market value of
the gas "sold or used by the lessee in operations not connected with
the land." In 1961, defendant sold the gas to an interstate gas pur-
chaser (American Louisiana Pipeline Company). It then paid the lessors
royalties based on the price in this 1961 gas sales contract. In 1978,
the lessors sued the lessee for outstanding royalties, claiming that
they were owed the difference between the royalties they actually
had been paid and the royalties based on the current market value
of the gas. The trial court ruled in favor of the lessors, holding that
the term "market value" in the gas royalty clauses meant current
market value. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed and held that "market value"
meant the price for which gas could be sold when it was first com-
mitted for sale to the purchaser. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,
418 So. 2d 1334 (1982).
When parties base gas royalty payments on the "market Value"
of the gas, problems arise concerning where market value is to be
determined,2 what market is to determine the market value,' if there
is a market for the gas at all,4 and, if so, whether market value is
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1. 401 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
2. See Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934).
3. This includes the question of whether the federal ceiling price for natural gas
should influence the determination of market value in a gas'royalty clause. Before
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. SS 3301-3432 (Supp. 11 1978), only inter-
state gas purchases were regulated. Some lessees sold gas to interstate gas purchasers
and based royalty payments on the price received in such sales. Lessors claimed market
value should be determined by the intrastate price. For decisions holding the federal
ceiling price to be irrelevant, see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d
256 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 876 (1977), reh'g denied, 440 U.S. 931 (1979). But see Brent v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
4. Harrell, Recent Development in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 31 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX-N 327, 343 (1980). Professor Harrell argues that there is no
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to be determined before or after the lessee has processed the gas and
made it marketable.'
An additional problem concerns when market value is to be deter-
mined. This problem arises when a lessee commits the gas to a long-
term gas sales contract and pays royalties to the lessor based upon
the price received under such contract. Years later, the lessor files
suit for overdue royalties claiming that the royalties paid to him have
not been based on the current value of the gas. Succinctly stated the
problem is whether the parties intended for royalty payments to be
determined by the market value of the gas when the lessee committed
it to the gas sales contract or the current market value computed
on a daily basis as the gas is produced and delivered to the purchaser.
The meaning of the term "market value" has been the source of
frequent litigation in numerous jurisdictions.' The Texas position is
best represented by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Texas Oil
& Gas v. Vela.7 In Vela, the lessee, in 1937, committed gas for pur-
chase under a long-term gas sales contract. In the early 1960s, he
was sued for outstanding royalties when the current market price
began to far exceed the contract price. The Texas Supreme Court
held that despite any good faith efforts of the lessee to prudently
market the gas' and any circumstances or conditions affecting the oil
and gas industry at the time the lease was confected,9 there was no
market for gas in the traditional sense. Gas can be sold only if there is a purchaser
near the well with enough money to spend to connect his lines to the well.
5. Compare Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932)
(lessee required to pay royalty on value of gasoline extracted from the gas produced,
but lessor had to share extraction costs) with McCoy v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co.,
57 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. La. 1932) (lessee required to pay royalty on value of raw gas,
even though gasoline was later extracted),
6. See.generally Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964); Lightcap
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977), reh'g
denied, 440 U.S. 931 (1979); Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla.
1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
7. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); see also Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448,
562 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977), reh'g denied, 440 U.S. 931 (1979).
8. 429 S.W.2d at 870. The Texas court noted the uncontested nature of the trial
court's determination that the lessee had marketed the gas in good faith. It is well
established that the lessee has the duty to market any gas produced in paying quan-
tities as a reasonably prudent operator. This includes the duty to market the gas
promptly at arm's length for the best possible price once gas in paying quantities
is discovered. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122 (1974), comment; 5 H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW S 853 (1982); Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants
to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 177 (1976).
9. 429 S.W.2d at 870. The Texas court noted several circumstances and condi-
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indication of any intent of the parties to tie the lessor's royalties to
the gas sales contract price. The court found that the gas sales con-
tract was completely separate from the lease and the intended mean-
ing of the term "market value" was unaffected by such contract." The
court noted that the parties knew how to base royalty payments on
the gas sales contract price since the royalty for "casinghead gas""
was tied to the "proceeds received" from its sale and concluded that
as this same method was not used to determine the royalty for gas
well gas, 2 the parties must have intended for market value to mean
something else. The court then held that the parties intended market
value to mean the current price for which gas comparable in "time,
quality and availability to marketing outlets" could be sold. 3
The Oklahoma position is best set forth in the Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision in Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey." The lessee in Tara
committed gas for purchase in the interstate market under a two-
year gas sales contract. Shortly thereafter, the federal price ceiling
for interstate gas sales was raised substantially. The lessor sued for
outstanding royalties, claiming that he was owed royalties based on
the difference between the federally determined ceiling price and the
gas sales contract price.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was unwilling to ignore both the
lessee's implied obligation to prudently market the gas'" and the prac-
tions affecting the lessee's decision to market the gas. First, the bargain was struck
with the only nearby gas purchaser. Second, the lessee had no choice but to sell the
gas at the price the gas purchaser stipulated and on a "life of the lease" basis. Third,
gas is not sold on a day-to-day basis; it can be marketed only under a long-term con-
tract that fixes the price to be paid throughout its term.
10. The court stated:
[Nione of the royalty owners has ever agreed to accept royalties on the basis
of the price stipulated in the contracts. The royalties to which they are entitled
must be determined from the provisions of the oil and gas lease, which was
executed prior to and is wholly independent of the gas sales contract.
429 S.W.2d at 870.
11. 429 S.W.2d at 871. Casinghead gas is "Iglas produced with oil in oil wells,
the gas being taken from the well through the casinghead at the top of the well, as
distinguished from gas produced from a gas well." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 8, at 88.
12. "Gas well gas" is a term used to denote "gas produced other than in associa-
tion with the production of oil from an oil well." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 8, at 312. Gas well gas is gas extracted from a well that is mostly producing
natural gas. It is handled and processed differently than casinghead gas.
13. 429 S.W.2d at 872.
14. 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
15. See note 8, supra.
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ticalities of the oil and gas industry.'" It held that when the parties
base gas royalties on market value and the lessee markets in good
faith, market value is the price that the lessee receives in the gas
purchase agreement. The court noted that a different result would
be reached if the lessee did not prudently market the gas. Although
the Oklahoma court sought an equitable result, the decision was based
upon the court's opinion that parties to gas production contracts in-
tend market value to be determined at the time the lessee fulfills
his implied obligation to prudently market by committing the gas for
purchase.
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court sided with the
Oklahoma position. In a 4-3 decision, the court held that the parties
intended for market value to be determined at the time the lessee
fulfilled his implied obligation to prudently market the gas by com-
mitting it for purchase. To support this decision, Justice Blanche,
writing for the majority, first discussed the practicalities of the oil
and gas industry. He noted that the lessee's duty to market gas as
a reasonably prudent operator is well-founded in Louisiana law."? He
observed that American Louisiana Pipeline Company was the only
available purchaser of gas in the field where the lessor's property
was located; therefore, the lessee had the choice of either selling the
gas to American Louisiana or not selling it at all. He further found
that the gas purchase agreement was negotiated in good faith and
at arm's length, resulting in an agreement favorable to both the lessor
and the lessee.'8 Finally, he recognized the universal industry prac-
16. See note 9, supra.
17. 418 So. 2d at 1335. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122 (1974) provides:
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound
to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property
leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and
his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent con-
duct on the part of the lessee.
The comments to article 122 of the Mineral Code suggest that the basis of the
article is Civil Code article 2710, which requires the lessee to "enjoy the thing leased
as a good administrator."
The comments to article 122 recognize the lessee's obligation to act as a reasonably
prudent operator in four ways, one of which includes the obligation to prudently market.
For Louisiana cases discussing the obligation to prudently market, see Risinger v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941); Hutchinson v. Atlas Oil
Co., 148 La. 540, 87 So. 265 (1921); Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil
Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979); Lelong
v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
18. 418 So. 2d at 1336. When the gas in question was marketed in 1961, a buyers'
market existed because of the abundant supply of gas and its relatively stable price.
Ballard & Cordell was given a "take it or leave it" offer by American Louisiana which
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tice whereby gas purchasers demand long-term gas sales contracts
and noted the substantial capital outlay needed for gas purchasers
to build the necessary pipeline facilities to transport gas from wells
to the main lines.1 9
After noting that the issue was res nova in Louisiana," the Henry
court examined the approach taken in other jurisdictions. The majority
found the Vela decision unsatisfactory because the Texas Supreme
Court refused to interpret market value in light of the economic
necessities of the oil and gas industry.2 The court recognized three
factors that should be considered in the interpretation of gas royalty
provisions. First, a mineral lease that requires the lessee to pay the
lessor a fractional royalty interest is an undertaking in the nature
of a cooperative venture.22 The lessor supplies the land, and the lessee
supplies the capital, machinery, skill, and manpower necessary to
develop the property. The. lessee therefore has an implied obligation
to develop the property as a reasonably prudent operator for the
benefit of both parties. Second, the objective of the royalty provision
required the lessee to construct a pipeline one mile to the north (off the premises)
in order to connect to American Louisiana's lines. Still, Ballard & Cordell was able
to negotiate an escalation clause. The contract was to last 20 years. American Loui-
siana was to pay 18.25 cents mcf for the first five years, 20.75 cents mcf for the second
five years, 23.25 cents mcf for the third five years, and 25.75 cents mcf for the re-
maining five years. The evidence established that this contract was excellent at the
time. See Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 401 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
19. 418 So. 2d at 1336. See Harrell, supra note 4, at 341; Holliman, Exxon Corp.
v. Middleton: Some Answers but Additional Confusion in the Volatile Area of Market
Value Gas Royalty Litigation, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 72 (1981).
20. 418 So. 2d at 1335. In Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152
So. 561 (1934), the Louisiana Supreme Court defined market value as "the price actually
given in current market dealings." However, this part of the Wall decision was dicta.
The controversy in Wall concerned where market value was to be determined (off the
premises or at the well), not when. All parties agreed that the current value should
be paid. No Louisiana decision other than Henry has directly faced the issue of when
market value is to be determined where long-term gas sales contracts are involved.
21. 418 So. 2d at 1337. See note 9, supra.
22. 418 So. 2d at 1338. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 8, S 802.1;
Harrell, Development in Nonregulatory Oil & Gas Law, 30 INST. ON OIL & GAS 1L. &
TAX'N 311, 334 (1979). The mineral exploration undertaking is compared to the joint
venture in a nontechnical sense. It is, however, an association of two or more parties
for the single purpose of profiting from a single activity-mineral exploration. The
above authors argue that the obligation of the lessee to prudently develop the leasehold
arises from the implied expectations of the parties to this cooperative venture. Contra
Martin, supra note 8, at 198, where the author argues that the reasonably prudent
operator standard "grows out of an attempt on the part of the courts to promote
... justice and fair dealing by requiring lessees to adhere to a particular norm of
conduct."
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is to fix a division of the minerals produced.23 Oil usually is divided
in kind,2 4 and the lessor usually has the authority to dispose of the
product as he wishes. However, the physical nature of gas dictates
that it cannot be handled like oil; hence, the parties to a mineral lease
usually contemplate that the lessee will dispose of the gas for the
lessor." The lessor is compensated by receiving a portion of the value
of the gas produced. Third, at the time of confection of the Henry
leases, gas could not be marketed prudently on a short-term basis.
Such markets did not exist," or the price obtained in them was lower
than that obtained in the long-term market.
The majority noted with approval that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
had interpreted the Tara gas royalty provision in light of industry cir-
cumstances and conditions. 8 The majority found "strong support" for
this position in the Civil Code articles on contract interpretation.29
23. 418 So. 2d at 1338. See 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 8, S 642;
Harrell, supra note 22, at 334.
24. 418 So. 2d at 1338. See Harrell, supra note 22, at 335. In-kind royalty involves
a division of the physical substance in proportion to each party's fractional interest.
25. 418 So. 2d at 1338. Gas is difficult to handle and transport, and few lessors
have the expertise or resources necessary to market it. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 8, S 853; Harrell, supra note 22, at 335; see generally Holliman,
supra note 19.
26. See note 9, supra. See also Harrell, supra note 22, at 335; Holliman, supra
note 19, at 72.
27. 418 So. 2d at 1339. Understandably, if a gas purchaser is to suffer the ex-
penses of constructing the pipeline facilities necessary to connect his main lines to
the well, he should be willing to pay more for a long-term commitment at a stable
price than for a short-term commitment.
28. Id. at 1339.
29. Id. at 1339 (citing LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1945-1962). Article 1945, which contains
the basic rules for contract interpretation, provides:
Legal agreements having the effects of law upon the parties, none but the par-
ties can abrogate or modify them. Upon this principle are established the follow-
ing rules:
First-That no general or special legislative act can be so construed as to avoid
or modify a legal contract previously made;
Second-That courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts according
to the intent of all the parties;
Third-That the intent is to be determined by the words of the contract, when
these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences;
Fourth-That it is the common intent of the parties-that is, the intention of
all-that is to be sought for; if there was a difference in this intent, there was
no common consent and, consequently, no contract.
The following rule is well established in Louisiana: Where a written agreement
is unclear, ambiguous, or will lead to absurd or impossible consequences, the court
should look beyond it to gather the true intent of the parties. See Boisseu v. Vallon
& Jordano, 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932); Bohm v. CIT Financial Servs., 348 So. 2d
132 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 673 (1977).
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According to article 1950,30 a court should ascertain the common intent
of the parties when anything is doubtful. The Henry majority considered
the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was
confected and concluded that in light of the lessee's well-known obliga-
tion to prudently market the gas, the need to market gas on a long-term
basis, and the custom of the industry to calculate gas royalty payments
on the amount received in the gas sales contract,3" the parties intended
market value to be determined by the 1961 gas sales contract price.
As the courts search for the parties' intent, they should consider the circumstances
and conditions affecting the parties at the time the contract was agreed to. See Loui-
siana Power & Light Co. v. Town of Arcadia, 119 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. La. 1954); Cooley
v. Meridian Lumber Co., 195 La. 631, 197 So. 255 (1940); Andrews Coal Co. v. Board
of Directors of Pub. Schools, Parish of Orleans, 151 La. 695, 92 So. 303 (1922). The
courts should construe ambiguous terms as the parties must have understood them.
See Salles v. Stafford; Derbes & Roy, 173 La. 361, 137 So. 62 (1931).
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1950 provides: "When there is anything doubtful in
agreements, we must endeavor to ascertain what was the common intention of the
parties, rather than to adhere to the literal sense of the terms." See Jacka v. Ouachita
Parish School Bd., 249 La. 223, 186 So. 2d 571 (1966); Herbert v. Valenti, 235 So. 2d
193 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
31. The Louisiana Supreme Court and the court of appeal both found that there
is an industry practice whereby lessees base royalty payments on the price they receive
in the gas sales contract. This is understandable because the best indication of market
value is the gas sales contract price and the lessee would not want to pay the lessor's
royalty based on a higher price than the lessee receives under the gas sales contract.
418 So. 2d at 1340. See Harrell, supra note 4; Holliman, supra note 19.
As authority for interpreting market value in light of industry "custom," the court
cited Civil Code article 1964: "Equity, usage and law supply such incidents only as
the parties may reasonably be supposed to have been silent upon from a knowledge
that they would be supplied from one of these sources."
The court probably meant to refer to an industry "usage" instead of a "custom."
A usage lacks an essential element of a custom-the opinio juris, or the psychological
conviction in the community that the practice has legal sanction and binds the parties.
Customs do not have to be proven or alleged by the parties to be binding; usages
must be proven. Customs bind the parties unless the parties specifically derogate from
them; usages bind the parties only if it is proven that both parties were aware or
can at least be presumed to have been aware of them. See generally F. GENY, METHOD
OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW nos. 119 & 132 (2d ed. La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1963); New Roads Oilmill & Mfg. Co. v. Kline, Wilson & Co., 154
F. 296 (5th Cir. 1907).
The court apparently used the term "custom" loosely to refer to the industry "usage"
of basing gas royalty payments on the gas sales contract price. It is doubtful that
this practice is so well established and widely recognized that it has achieved the
status of a custom.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1953 provides: "Whatever is ambiguous is determined accor-
ding to the usage of the country where the contract is made." Article 1964 supplies
incidents to a contract where the parties are silent. Article 1953 is a rule of contract
interpretation which is to be used to construe ambiguous terms that the parties have
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As noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, Vela and its progeny
have been criticized for their failure to recognize the nature of the
mineral exploration undertaking; therefore, a closer look at that under-
taking is necessary. 2 The lessee's duty to prudently market the gas
produced arises out of the cooperative nature of the parties' relation-
ship. This obligation is well recognized by Louisiana law,3 and as with
the other implied obligations,34 the lessee may be subject to cancella-
tion of the lease or damages if he fails to fulfill it. 5
Two important aspects of the lessee's duty to prudently market
the gas should be noted. First, when the parties base gas royalties
on market value, they must have some market in mind. That market
must be either fluctuous, as in a current market, or stable and deter-
minable, as in a market existing at some definite point in time. The
profits of the mineral exploration undertaking cannot be divided until
the gas is sold; therefore, the parties probably intend for market value
to be determined in the market in which the lessee fulfills the parties'
expectations by selling the gas to their profit. This market is fixed
in time when the lessee enters the gas purchase agreement pursuant
to his obligation to prudently market the gas. Since this is the market
most likely contemplated by the parties, the courts should base gas
royalties on it unless a clear intent to do otherwise is expressed. 6
. Second, part of the obligation to prudently market is the obliga-
tion to market at the best possible price.7 Both parties intend for the
used. Although the court was not wrong in applying usage according to article 1964,
article 1953 is additional codal authority for construing the term "market value" in
light of industry usage. See generally Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Tex. v. Miller,
272 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967); Szush Mach. Works v. Shell Oil Co., 344 So. 2d 699
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Fee v. Vancouver Plywood Co., 331 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1976); Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 12 La. App. 625, 125 So. 757 (2d Cir. 1930).
32. See note 22, supra.
33. See note 17, supra.
34. See LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:122 (1974), comment.
35. See generally id.; see, e.g., Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101,
3 So. 2d 289 (1941) (lack of available technology to separate salt water from gas at
an economical price excused lessee from marketing gas); Hutchison v. Atlas Oil Co.,
148 La. 540, 87 So. 265 (1921) (lease was cancelled because of lessee's failure to develop
and market); Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (lack of
available market excused lessee's failure to further develop and market, thereby
defeating lessor's suit to cancel lease).
36. Fischl argues that as the gas sales contract is being "within the contempla-
tion of the parties at the making of the lease [it] should be binding upon lessor when
entered into by lessee in good faith." Fischl, Ascertaining the Value or Price of Gas
fi)r Purposes of the Royalty Clause, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 22, 31 (1968); see also Harrell,
supra note 22, at 336.
37. M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL & GAS LEASES 5 84 (2d ed. 1940 &
Supp. 1964); see Roy v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 200 La. 233, 7 So. 2d 895 (1942).
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lessee to obtain the best possible price, and it is a breach of the im-
plied obligation to market for the lessee to sell the gas at anything
less. If the lessor did not intend to base his royalty on the market
value represented by the gas sales contract price, he would not care
about the price at which the gas was sold. 8 The lessor must have
intended to base his royalty on the gas sales contract price if he also
intended to impose upon the lessee the obligation to market at the
best possible price. The reason for imposing this duty is to protect
the lessor's interest in his royalty. Hence, unless a clear contrary in-
tent is expressed, the lessor's royalty is entitled to no more protec-
tion than the lessee's good faith, arm's length bargaining for the best
possible price.39
As the court recognized, when most leases currently in produc-
tion were signed, the best market for gas, if there was a market at
all, was the long-term market.4 Few gas purchasers were willing to
spend the large amounts of time and resources necessary to build
transportation lines from their main lines to gas wells unless they
could be assured of the right to buy the gas at a set price for a long
period of time. The closer a gas well was to a gas purchaser's pipeline,
the easier it was for the lessee to bargain with the purchaser over
such matters as price and contract duration. However, a gas well could
be so remote that no gas purchasers were willing to spend the
necessary time and money to transport the gas.41 In this predicament,
the lessee had little choice but to transport the gas himself. Loui-
siana has long recognized the lessee's right to deduct transportation
costs proportionately from the lessor's royalty payments.42 Unfor-
tunately, the lessee's decision to build the requisite transportation
facilities did not necessarily mean he could escape the demands for
a long-term commitment. When most leases currently in production
were signed, a buyers' market existed and lessees had very poor
bargaining power.43
It seems unlikely that the parties in Henry intended to base gas
royalty payments on a current value basis-they knew that the lessee
had the obligation to market the gas and that he would be forced
to market it under a long-term contract. If market value was inter-
38. Harrell, supra note 4, at 329.
39. For an excellent discussion, see Fischl, supra note 36, at 22.
40. 418 So. 2d at 1338. See Harrell, supra note 22, at 335.
41. Because of a variety of factors (poor quality gas, remote location of wells,
quantity of the reserve), there may not be a willing buyer for gas from a particular
well. See note 4, supra.
42. See Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561 (1934); Coyle
v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990, 144 So. 737 (1932).
43. See note 18, supra.
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preted as current value, the lessee would have assumed all the risks
of future gas price escalation. This would be inconsistent with the
nature of the mineral exploration undertaking, where both parties
share the risks." Furthermore, it is unlikely that the parties intended
to base gas royalties on a current, short-term market when, at the
time the Henry leases were completed, gas simply was not sold in
this manner. 5
Another problem concerns when the sale of gas is final. In Loui-
siana, gas is not owned by anyone until it is extracted and reduced
to possession;46 hence, the gas purchaser does not own the gas until
it is pumped out of the ground and into his lines. This makes the
gas purchase contract executory.'7 The Vela court reasoned that since
the parties based the gas royalty on the market value of gas sold
or used off the premises and since the gas was not "sold" until it
was delivered to the gas purchaser, the parties intended the market
value to be determined as the gas was delivered to the purchaser. 8
Under this approach, the lessee's profit remains constant while the
lessor's profit escalates on a daily basis for as long as the gas is
delivered and its price rises.49 However, the parties may not have
intended for "sold" to refer to when gas was delivered. Concerns over
when gas is sold (or reduced to possession and ownership) are nor-
mally considered by the lessee and the gas purchaser." The purpose
of a gas royalty clause is not to determine when gas is sold, but to
divide the value of the gas between the lessee and the lessor. Since
the lessee has the obligation to prudently market the gas, it is logical
to assume that the parties intended for "sold" to mean that point in
time when the lessee fulfilled his obligation to market by committing
44. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
45. See text at note 40, supra.
46. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:7 (1974) provides: "Minerals are reduced to posses-
sion when they are under physical control that permits delivery to another." The leading
Louisiana decision on when the ownership of minerals vests is Frost-Johnson Lumber
Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922), wherein the court held that a
landowner does not own the minerals beneath his property; instead, he owns the ex-
clusive right to search for them and reduce them to possession. A landowner does
not own minerals until they have been reduced to possession.
47. An executory contract is "a contract that has not as yet been fully completed
or performed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 512 (5th ed. 1979).
48. 429 S.W.2d at 871.
49. Clearly, different economic conditions would cause the opposite result. The
lessor's royalty would decrease if the price for gas decreased, while the lessee would
continue to receive the amount stipulated in the gas sales contract. It is unlikely that
a lessor would intend such a result.
50. Holliman, supra note 19, at 68.
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the gas for sale.5' When the parties base gas royalties on the market
value when "sold off the premises," they more likely are concerned
with confection of the gas sales contract than with delivery to the
gas purchaser. In this context, "sold" should have a broader meaning
than "when title vests."52 If market value is to be determined at the
time the lessee markets the gas, the best evidence of that value is
the price for which the gas is prudently marketed."
The Henry court correctly considered the industry usage of basing
gas royalty payments on the gas sales contract price.' No lack of skill
or experience was proven by any of the lessors, and the complexity
of the leases indicated that experienced parties confected them. In
dissent, Justice Watson said the leases were not "negotiated,"5
thereby implying that the lessors knew nothing of the oil and gas
industry or the terms of the leases and implying that the lessors were
presented with stock industry lease forms and given the choice of
either accepting or rejecting the terms therein. However, the court
of appeal had found that "[tihere was no evidence presented from
which the [district] court could reasonably have concluded that the
lessee in these cases had prepared the leases."" If both parties par-
ticipated in the preparation of the leases, it is reasonable to conclude
that the lessors were knowledgeable, experienced, and aware of in-
dustry usages.
Although the supreme court did not discuss it, the purpose of
calculating gas royalties differently when gas is "sold or used off the
premises," rather than sold "at the well," should be considered. Gas
is considered "sold off the premises" when the lessee transports the
gas off the property where it is produced in order to market it. Gas
is "sold at the well" when the gas purchaser bears the expense of
connecting his lines to the well. 7 When the lessee bears transporta-
tion expenses, he is entitled to compensation from the lessor as a
result 8 and he usually gets a higher price from the gas purchaser.
If the lessor's royalties are based on the total proceeds that the lessee
51. Harrell, supra note 4, at 332; Holliman, supra note 19, at 69.
52. Holliman, supra note 19, at 69.
53. Harrell, supra note 4, at 343-46. Professor Harrell argues quite persuasively
that the market value of gas is best determined by the price the lessee obtains in
an arm's length gas sales contract, taking into consideration all of the circumstances
and conditions affecting the particular time and place of the sale.
54. See note 31, supra.
55. 418 So. 2d at 1344.
56. 401 So. 2d at 606.
57. See Holliman, supra note 19, at 68.
58. See text at note 42, supra.
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receives from sales off the premises, the lessor takes advantage of
the higher price the lessee receives without compensating the lessee
for his expenses. Therefore, by basing the royalty for gas sold off
the premises on its market value at the well, the parties properly
compensate the lessee for his transportation expenses, i.e., they
calculate the royalty on the lower price that would have been received
at the well had the gas in fact been sold there. 9 However, this ex-
planation of why the parties compute royalties differently when gas
is "sold off the premises" or "at the well" has nothing to do with
whether market value is interpreted as current and fluctuating or
stable and determinable.
It is difficult to think of any reason why the parties would want
to distinguish between gas sold at the well and gas sold off the
premises other than for purposes of compensation to the lessee for
transportation and processing expenses. If the lessor intends the term
"market value" to be interpreted as current value, thereby protect-
ing his royalty from future price increases, there is no reason for him
to desire this protection only for gas sold off the premises (and not
for gas sold at the well); nevertheless, the leases in Henry based
royalties on market value only when the gas was sold off the
premises."0
59. Of course, it is not suggested that basing gas royalties on the market value
at the well when gas is sold off the premises is the only way to compensate the lessee
for his transportation and processing expenses.
60. One interpretation of the royalty clause provides an explanation for why lessors
would want their royalties based on future price increases only for gas sold "off the premises."
Lessors could argue that since gas is reduced to possession and ownership when it
is first brought out of the ground, that is when the parties intend to divide the value
of the gas between themselves. The lessee has the obligation to prudently market
the gas at that point, and if he does so, the lessor will be satisfied with the price
he receives in the sale. However, if the lessee takes the gas off the premises, he does
so at his own risk. He no longer has the obligation to prudently market the gas, and
he can dispose of it as he pleases. Therefore, the lessor needs protection from the
possible folly of the lessee when he sells the gas off the premises. The lessor thus
demands the current market value of the gas since he cannot be sure when the lessee
will market the gas off the premises or whether the lessee's personal venture will
prove profitable.
The obvious problem with the above interpretation of the gas royalty clause is
that it assumes the parties are primarily concerned with where the gas is delivered,
instead of how the gas is sold. See text at notes 51-52, supra. In addition, it penalizes
the lessee when he sells gas off the premises out of necessity instead of by choice.
See text at notes 40-41, supra. It also assumes that lessors need protection from lessees,
ignoring the fact that the lessee invariably has more time, money, and resources in-
vested in the venture than does the lessor. The lessee will seldom if ever sell the
gas imprudently or in bad faith since his financial outcome is always determined by
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The Henry dissenters felt that the proper approach was to con-
strue the lease's ambiguity against the lessee, since they felt that
he was the party who had drafted the lease. 1 Their authority was
articles 1957 and 1958.62 In addition, a rule peculiar to the oil and
gas industry provides that any ambiguity in a mineral lease should
be construed against the lessee. 3 Louisiana has given this rule lip
service in the past;64 however, it is not well-founded in Louisiana law65
and the intent of the parties should be ascertained if at all possible.
The courts should construe ambiguity against the lessee only if the
common intent of the parties cannot be ascertained. The majority's
effort to find the parties' intent is more in accord with proper con-
tract interpretation.
Although the Henry decision favors the lessee, 7 a careful reading
of the majority opinion indicates that Louisiana has not embraced the
broad rule espoused by the Tara court. 8 According to Tara, any time
the gas sale. See Martin, supra note 8, at 202. Finally, the above interpretation assumes
that the parties intend to relieve the lessee of the obligation to prudently market
when gas is sold off the premises, despite the uniform judicial imposition of this obliga-
tion in the past. See note 8, supra.
61. 418 So. 2d at 1342, 1344 (Dennis, Watson, & Lemmon, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Dennis believed the intent of the parties was to base market value on the current
market value. However, he believed that if this was not the clear intent, Civil Code
articles 1957 and 1958 applied. Justice Watson believed that articles 1957 and 1958
applied since the lease was not "negotiated."
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1957 provides: "In a doubtful case the agreement is inter-
preted against him who'has contracted the obligation." LA. CIV. CODE art. 1958 pro-
vides: "But if the doubt or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explanation which
one of the parties ought to have given, or from any other negligence or fault of his,
the construction most favorable to the other party shall be adopted, whether he be
obligor or obligee." See Miller v. Kellerman, 228 F. Supp. 446 (W.D. La. 1964); Ed-
wards v. Terminix 57, Inc., 292 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); Cyr v. Louisiana Intra-
state Gas Corp., 273 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Leithman v. Dolphin Swimming
Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
63. I. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS: A REVISION OF THORNTON
ON OIL & GAS S 16.1 (1962).
64. Rives v. Gulf Ref. Co. of La., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
65. See Hunt Trust v. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp., 210 La. 945, 28 So. 2d 669
(1946); Fee v. Vancouver Plywood Lumber Co., 331 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
see also 2 W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS 485 (1959).
66. Fee v. Vancouver Plywood Lumber Co., 331 So. 2d 151, 155 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
67. The decision favored the Henry lessee because the price of gas rose after
the gas sales contract was confected; however, the decision would have favored the
lessor had the price of gas gone down after the gas sales contract was confected.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
68. Tara Petroleum Co. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the parties base gas royalty payments on the market value of the
gas and the lessee markets the gas as a reasonably prudent operator,
the court automatically will afford the lessee protection by defining
market value as the value represented in the gas sales contract. The
Henry majority, however, emphasized that its holding was strictly
limited to those findings of fact before the court concerning the in-
tent of the parties to the specific leases.69 The court did not want
to penalize the lessee's good faith efforts to market the gas by making
him pay royalties based on a fluctuous, current market value several
times higher than the price he was receiving under the gas sales con-
tract. However, the court indicated that if it had been faced with dif-
ferent circumstances, the result would have been different: "Had plain-
tiffs shown that the purpose of the market value royalty clause was
to provide them with protection as to price ... then we would arrive
at a different conclusion."7 Justice Calogero concurred only because
he believed that the holding was limited to the specific leases before
the court and because he believed the defendants proved the parties'
intent better than the plaintiffs."
The results of future litigation in this area will be determined
by which side best proves the parties' intent. Lessors should present
evidence that they intended, through the use of the term "market
value," to protect themselves from royalty payments which did not
reflect the current value of the gas. Lessees should urge the fairness
of the result reached in Henry and look for evidence to prove that
their lessors were experienced and fully aware of the nature of the
mineral exploration undertaking and the circumstances of the oil and
gas industry.
Frederick Scott Kaiser
69. Applying the pertinent rules of contract interpretation to the evidence presented
in these cases, we find the parties to the mineral leases at issue intended that
royalties based on the "market value" of the gas be computed on the basis of
the price received for the gas under the 1961 sales contract.
418 So. 2d at 1340 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1341.
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